China has had a remarkably high ratio of investment to output ever since economic reform began in 1978, surpassing almost all other economies. This is an important proximate determinant of China's high growth rate. This paper gathers together the available evidence to explain why investment is so high: factors both on the demand and on the supply side, and in the latter case the availability of both resources and funds. It analyzes the rate of return on capital and its evolution, and the factors that have kept it up. It draws on the literature to explain the high saving rate, and considers why the imperfect capital market and institutional deficiencies have not constrained investment. The state-owned and private sectors are treated separately because of their different objectives, behavior, and funding.
Introduction
An outstanding feature of the Chinese economy during the reform period is the remarkably high ratio of investment to output. Figure 1 shows the ratio over three decades: We see that real gross capital formation averaged a fairly steady 38 percent of real GDP. The rate of gross ªxed capital formation increased signiªcantly in recent years: The average rose from 29 percent in the period 1978-90 to 36 percent in the period [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] , and it has exceeded 40 percent since 2002. Inventory accumulation peaked in 1990, reºecting economic recession, and declined gradually owing to reforms away from the planned economy.
Although by no means the only determinant, gross ªxed capital formation is found to be an important proximate determinant of China's high rate of economic growth in cross-province and cross-country growth regressions (Ding and Knight 2008a, 2009) . It deserves to be understood. Two basic questions are raised, relating to the demand for and the supply of investment. What drives the demand for investment? Is investment governed by the supply side? The answers to both questions can shed light on the efªciency of China's investment. We consider these questions in turn. Section 2 analyzes the demand for investment. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the supply side: resources for investment and funds for investment respectively. The implications of the analysis for the efªciency of investment, and its implications, are examined in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
The demand for investment
Within the framework of a competitive market economy, the implication of high investment is that it is highly proªtable, and that the answer to the ªrst question is to be found from estimates of the rate of return on capital. Within the framework of a neo-classical growth model, the implication of a high return on capital is that the economy is out of equilibrium, having a capital/labor ratio below its steady state level. Thus, capital accumulation takes place rapidly, and the return on capital can be expected to fall as the capital/labor ratio approaches its equilibrium level.
The issue has been examined within both of these frameworks by Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) . The authors use data for the economy as a whole to measure the capital stock over the reform period and the rate of return on capital to answer the question: Does China invest too much? They make careful use of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data, along with several necessary assumptions, to derive estimates of the real rate of return on capital in the economy as a whole over the reform period. The real rate of return is obtained from ªgures of non-labor income; capital stock estimated by the perpetual inventory method for 1952 and extended forward using gross ªxed-capital formation, assumptions about depreciation, and corrections for changes in the price of capital relative to output.
Their baseline return on capital estimated in this way was fairly steady at about 25 percent from 1979 until 1993. It fell over the next 5 years, and remained roughly constant at 20 percent from 1998 until 2005 (Bai, Hsieh, and Qian 2006) . These high rates derive from a high capital share of income (quite close to 50 percent throughout), a low capital-output ratio (only 1.4 in the period up to 1993, then rising to about 1.6 from 1998 onward), and a depreciation rate of about 10 percent throughout. Ignoring relative price changes, these illustrative numbers do indeed produce approximate rates of return of 25 percent in the period 1978-93 and 20 percent in the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . In a comparison of 52 countries, the authors show that China's return on capital is exceptionally high, even standardizing for output per worker.
The authors also show that there were considerable differences in the return on capital across provinces, being highest in eastern and lowest in western China, but that the provincial dispersion fell over time. They go on to modify their aggregate baseline estimates to take account of several possible complications. The most important of these are the deduction of taxes on enterprises (reducing the return substantially), the inclusion of inventories investment (also reducing the return), and the exclusion of the (urban) housing sector (raising the return). When these adjustments are combined, the return to capital is found to average 10 percent over the years [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] but to rise to about 14 percent after 2000 (Bai, Hsieh, and Qian 2006) . On the basis of these results, the authors conclude that China does not invest too much.
These bold calculations are open to criticism, and indeed they were criticized by discussants of the paper. In particular, it might be queried whether all non-labor income is a return to capital. For instance, at the start of economic reform China had a centrally planned economy in which prices and wages, and therefore proªts, were administered, and these controls were only gradually dismantled as urban reform proceeded. Much price reform took place in the 1980s: Whereas in 1978 more than 95 percent of the prices of both producer goods and retail sales were ªxed by the state, in 1991 the ªgures were 36 percent and 21 percent, respectively (Dougherty and Herd 2005) . Prior to market liberalization, the high share of proªts was governed by the "price scissors" policy-that is, depressed agricultural producer prices made possible low wages and relatively high industrial prices (for instance, Knight and Song 1999) . The state extracted the proªts of the state-owned enterprises (SOE) sector to invest in planned industrial expansion; in this way it was the peasants who paid for industrialization (Knight 1995) .
It was not possible from the authors' NBS sources to disaggregate by ownership type. However, a ªrm-level data set (taken from OECD 2005) was used by one discussant (Blanchard 2006) to show that there is a sharp difference between private and state-controlled enterprises. In 1998 the rate of return (after tax, including inventories investment) in privately controlled industrial enterprises was 10.2 percent, compared with 4.8 percent in state-controlled industrial enterprises (Dougherty and Herd 2005) . The returns were higher but the difference was maintained in 2003, the corresponding ªgures being 15.0 percent and 10.2 percent. However, there was much variation within their state-controlled sample: it included both highly proªt-able enterprises and sectors, such as monopolistic utilities, and many loss-making enterprises and sectors. Another source reveals wide variation in spatial proªtabil-ity: In 2001 the return on net assets of local SOEs was positive in 12 and negative in 19 provinces, and varied from 6.6 percent in Guangdong to -8.3 percent in Heilongjiang (Ministry of Finance 2009).
This general pattern of results is conªrmed in the detailed study of industrial ªrms by Lu et al. (2008) . The authors examined nine indicators of proªtability using corporate accounting data. Irrespective of the indicator used, they showed a trend fall in the proªt rate from 1978 to 1998 and a subsequent rise, quickening from 2002 onward. For instance, pre-tax proªt over net ªxed assets was 25 percent in 1978, 3 percent in 1998, 9 percent in 2002, and 16 percent in 2006. Disaggregating by ownership type, the same indicator was 1.5 percent for SOEs and 12 percent for private ªrms in 1998 but rose to 12 percent for SOEs and 20 percent for private ªrms in 2005 (Lu et al. 2008) . Like Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) , the authors concluded from this trend in proªtability that China's capital stock remained sub-optimal. Table 1 , derived from the Finance Yearbook of China, shows that the ªnances of the SOE sector as a whole were dire in the late 1990s but improved over the period 1998-2007 (the earliest and the latest years for which the data are available). The number of SOEs was halved in that short time; this was almost entirely due to sales and closures by local governments. In 1998 the proªts of proªt-making SOEs only just exceeded the losses of loss-makers, whereas in 2007 the ratio was over 5 to 1. The return on assets rose from being negligible to 5 percent over the 9 years, and the growth in the return on net assets and in the proªt margin on sales was even more dramatic. During this period, the proportion of proªt-making SOEs rose from 31 to 57 percent, but even in 2007 as many as 43 percent recorded a loss. Considering only the industrial SOEs, the losses of loss-makers expressed as a proportion of pre-tax proªts rose from 3 percent in 1980-84 to 5 percent in 1985-89 and then to 20 percent in 1990-94, and ªnally to a likely peak in 1995-97 (for which years the data are not available); they were as high as 160 percent in 1998-99 but down to 23 percent in 2000 -04 (NBS 2005 .
The sharp improvement in the proªtability of the SOE sector after 1998 can be seen as a policy response to the collapse in proªtability, which threatened state revenue, the banking sector with its rising non-performing loans (NPLs), and the continuation of economic growth. Budget constraints were hardened, a vast redundancy program was imposed, and many inefªcient and unproªtable enterprises were closed down or sold off. Lu et al. (2008) attributed the relative increase in SOE proªtability since 1998 not only to SOE reform but also to the cancellation of bad bank debts and policies of sectorial entry restrictions favoring SOEs.
A high rate of proªt on existing capital can serve as a proxy for the expected rate of proªt on new investment. However, a high average rate does not necessarily mean that the expected marginal rate is also high. Moreover, even if the expected rate is high, this need not inºuence the demand for investment unless the proªt motive is important in investment decisions. At least until recently, the driver of much SOE investment could not have been expected proªtability (Zou 1991; Riedel, Jin, and 91 Asian Economic Papers Why Does China Invest So Much? Gao 2007). The main objective of management in Chinese state-owned and statedominated ªrms has been to maximize not proªts but the growth of investment and output. The reward to such bureaucrats takes the form of prestige, power, and the accompanying perks of commanding an organization, and the larger the organization the greater the reward. Hay et al. (1994) found that in 1988 investment was still largely determined by state planners allocating investment funds. However, investment was supplemented from the share of proªts that SOEs were now permitted to retain. This was encouraged by the security that "soft budgets" afforded. Jefferson, Zhang, and Zhao (1999) found that, by the time of their enterprise surveys in the early 1990s, over 80 percent of SOEs were subject to the "contract responsibility system." This gave them incentives to meet contracted targets, often set by local governments in terms of output. Local government ofªcials were in turn responding to the incentives to promote local economic development that the central government had created for them. For instance, Li and Zhou (2005) used turnover data on top province leaders between 1979 and 1995 to show that promotion and demotion depended on province GDP growth.
As China opened up to the world, and especially after entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the prospects for proªt by expanding exports created additional demand for investment. High export proªts were possible, partly from the disequilibria that had been created by trade restrictions and partly from the undervalued Chinese currency. However, the role of exports can be exaggerated: domestic value-added constitutes no more than half of export value (Koopman, Wang, and Wei 2008) . Thus, export value-added represented about 23 percent of the increase in GDP between 2001 and 2007.
Potential investors must have conªdence that they will achieve an adequate return on their investment. This may well require conªdence in the security of their property and of their business agreement. Such conªdence can be secured either through a formal legal system or informal substitutes. Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting (2008) examined how it was that Chinese investors had sufªcient conªdence in the security of property and in the enforcement of contracts to achieve such a high rate of investment. At the start of economic reform, administrative rules and interventions were adequate to resolve disputes, which were generally between parties under a common authority. With decentralization and privatization, the need for other, formal or informal, rules grew. Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting argued that, although the formal legal system had made great strides, particularly since 1992, it had developed in response to economic growth rather than being responsible for it. Instead, informal sources of security were primarily responsible for creating investor conªdence. The incentive system faced by both central and local government ofªcials rewarded eco-nomic growth, and their predictable behavior therefore provided security of property (except in the case of farmers losing their land for urban development). The traditional system of cultivating social networks-known as guanxi-helped to provide security of transactions.
There is empirical evidence that security of property and enforceability of contracts are indeed important for private investment. For instance, Cull and Xu (2005) 
The supply of investment: Resources
In most countries an investment rate as high as China's would generate severe macroeconomic imbalance. Given their much lower national saving rates, such a claim of investment expenditure on resources would generate a combination of inºation (of both investment goods and consumption goods) and deªcit in the current account of the balance of payments. The high investment rate would be unsustainable. This raises the question: How and why have the resources been available for China to invest such a high portion of GDP? That in turn requires an analysis of the sources of and reasons for saving (deªned as disposable income minus consumption).
In analyzing saving and investment, we wish to distinguish three sectors: enterprises, households, and government. It is not easy to obtain this breakdown from China's ofªcial statistics. However, Barnett and Brooks (2006) Barnett and Brooks (2006, Tables A2, A2a, A3, A3a, A4, A4a) .
Note: Wherever possible, "investment" is gross ªxed capital formation. However, the breakdown by sector is available only for "ªxed asset investment" (FAI) in the Kuijs data. FAI includes expenditure on existing assets, such as land and buildings. "Enterprises" are non-ªnancial enterprises.
Consider the sources of saving. In the 1990s, households contributed a higher share of national saving than enterprises but in the early 2000s the contributions were reversed. At that time enterprises saved no less than 18 percent of GDP, and 35 percent of their value-added; and households saved no less than 27 percent of their disposable income (Barnett and Brooks 2006) . Government saving fell in the 1990s and subsequently rose. The recent rise was assisted by the improvement in government revenue-raising powers after ªscal and enterprise reforms: its revenue rose from 47 percent of GDP in 1995-99 to 55 percent in 2000-05 (Barnett and Brooks 2006) .
What made such a high national saving rate possible? Households have become a major source of saving since the start of economic reform. Over the reform period, China's real GDP per capita rose nearly ten times, from US$ 165 in 1978 to US$ 1,598 in 2006. 1 One explanation is that, with higher income, households chose to save a higher proportion of their income (Riedel, Jin, and Gao 2007) . By contrast, Modigliani and Cao (2004) explained China's high private saving rate mainly in terms of the life cycle hypothesis. Their objective was to explain the remarkable rise in China's private saving rate, from about 3 percent in 1978 to approximately 33 percent in 2000. Rapid expected future growth of the economy can raise "permanent income" and thus reduce saving out of current income. By contrast, the authors hypothesized that rapid long-term economic growth resulting from the economic reform policy implied rapid growth in target wealth, which would raise the saving rate. They also hypothesized that the fall in the dependency ratio resulting from the one-child family policy also implied a rise in the saving rate. Indeed, the former effect was found to explain some 10 percentage points of the 30 percentage point rise in the saving rate and the latter effect another 10 percentage points. Moreover, income per capita no longer played a role when added to their equation.
Wei and Zhang (2009) offered a further explanation for the rise in household saving. The saving rate and the "sex ratio" (the ratio of boys to girls born 20 years previously) were positively correlated over time. The saving rate was higher in regions with a higher sex ratio, and households with a son saved more than households with a daughter. The authors argued that a shortage of marriageable girls created competition among households with boys, which responded by saving more on the basis that wealth and housing would help their sons in the competition for brides. Wei and Zhang estimated that marriage competition could potentially account for half of the increase in the household saving rate over the period 1990-2007.
Yet another contribution came from the new opportunities that were opened up by the economic reforms. Under central planning and the communes there was little incentive for households to save. This changed as households were given increasing scope for business and housing investment. Facing credit constraints, households responded to the new opportunities by saving for investment (Naughton 2007 ).
Economic insecurity grew over the reform period in both rural and urban China. Modigliani and Cao (2004) argued that the birth-control policy undermined the traditional role of children as old-age support; thus, in the absence of a publicly provided social security system in rural areas, it encouraged households to save for retirement. Urban economic reforms created a new motive for saving from the mid 1990s onward. As the private sector developed and as the "mini-welfare state" provided by state-owned enterprises was withdrawn and as large-scale labor retrenchment occurred, the heightened insecurity among urban workers could be expected to induce additional saving to replace state-funded services and to build up precautionary assets.
These arguments are supported by Chamon and Prasad (2008) , who found that, contrary to the normal life cycle pattern, the relationship between the urban household saving rate and the age of its head is U-shaped. They explained the rise in the urban household saving rate by 7 percentage points between 1995 and 2005 in terms of a rising future need to invest in a house and on education in the case of young households and the need to self-insure against ill-health in the case of old households.
We saw that enterprise and government saving also contribute to China's high saving rate. On the one hand, the imperfect capital market makes ªrms, especially private ªrms, rely mainly on their own funds (i.e., retained earnings) to ªnance investment. This provides them with a strong incentive to save. On the other hand, the proªtability of ªrms has increased signiªcantly since enterprise reform began in earnest in the mid 1990s. Moreover, given that the government did not seek dividends from SOEs in the period 1994-2008 and that the real interest earned in savings accounts is low, their rising proªts tend to be reinvested.
Government saving has been high since 1978 as a result of a policy favoring government-ªnanced investment over government consumption (Kuijs 2005) . The Chinese government was willing and able to take a long-run view because it expected to remain in power for many years, it was not subject to democratic pressures for "jam today," and the rapid growth of household incomes provided a shield against social discontent. Table 2 also shows the sectorial contributions to gross ªxed capital formation. The enterprise sector invested about 30 percent of GDP in all three periods, and the household sector (housing and household producers) invested 6 percent. The government contribution looks surprisingly small (no more than 4 percent of GDP) but some of the investment by enterprises, representing infrastructure investment by state-owned public utilities in sectors such as power, electricity, water, and transport, is more properly attributed to government, being both directed and funded by government. Net capital transfers were estimated to be 5 percent of GDP in the period 2000-05 (Barnett and Brooks 2006) . Nevertheless, as the enterprise sector accounted for more than three-quarters of total investment, it is enterprise investment that holds the key to China's remarkable investment rate.
The sectorial ªgures provided for the 1990s by Kuijs (2005) relate to "ªxed asset investment," not gross ªxed capital formation, and contain expenditure on existing assets. However, Barnett and Brooks (2006) show the saving-investment balance for the period 1995-2005. We see from Table 2 that enterprises as a whole invested more than they saved (by 14 percent of GDP in the late 1990s and by 11 percent in the early 2000s). By contrast, households saved more than they invested (by 13 percent of GDP and 10 percent respectively), therefore almost precisely offsetting the enterprise sector deªcit. There was a need for inter-sectorial as well as intra-sectorial ªn-ancial intermediation, either through the banking system or in more informal ways. The net ªnancial investment of the household sector was 11 percent of GDP in the period 2000-05, mainly (10 percent of GDP) in low-interest saving deposits. By contrast, the enterprise sector's net ªnancial investment in the same period was -7 percent of GDP. The main (gross) sources of funding its excess of investment over saving were loans (11 percent of GDP) and foreign investment (3 percent of GDP) (Barnett and Brooks 2006) .
The fact that proªtability increased for all ownership categories after 1998 despite the likely trend toward greater competition in product markets suggests that macroeconomic forces were at work. One possibility is that, given the exchange rate and international price levels, the tradable sector had comparatively high proªts, and this enabled the relative expansion of tradable goods production to raise the overall share of proªts. However, there is another possibility. Because the ratio of gross ªxed capital formation (GFCF) to GDP rose from 36 to 42 percent, and the share of proªts in national income rose from 27 to 37 percent over the period 1998-2007, it is feasible that the relative increase in investment was funded, at least in part, through a redistribution of income from wages to proªts, that is, this additional claim on resources was met by forcing up prices relative to wages. In other words, causation might to some extent have run from investment to proªts.
The underlying mechanism, attributable to Kaldor (1960) , takes the following form. Assume that the propensity to save out of proªts is considerably greater than the propensity to save out of wages. Thus a redistribution of national income from wages to proªts raises the national saving rate. Assume that investment is determined independently of saving. Accept that there is sufªcient ºexibility of prices and wages to ensure that output is normally at a level corresponding to the full employment of resources. This is achieved by a movement in the proªt share to a level that equates saving to investment. The equilibrium share of proªts is a function of the two saving propensities and an increasing function of the investment/ output ratio.
This mechanism is most likely to operate at an early stage of development, before price and wage rigidities become important and before saving becomes a function of national income, or of permanent income, rather than of factor shares. It is more likely to apply in the medium run, rather than the short run when output adjustment might dominate or the long run when competitive factor market forces might dominate. The mechanism may have relevance to China at its current stage of development.
The hypothesis is difªcult to test, partly because of endogeneity issues and partly because we do not expect the relationship to hold from one year to the next. Moreover, China's data on factor shares are weak-being available only by province and being published one year at a time and not as a consistent series. Construction of a national series requires weighted aggregation. 2 Furthermore, the year 2004 is missing and there is a discontinuity in the series between 2003 and 2005, which might explain much of the rise. This is likely to reºect new information emerging from the economic census of 2004. This information can represent changes in reporting either without changes in the economy or because of changes in the economy, for example, the growth of the urban informal sector. Only in the latter case is the observed trend in the series a reliable indicator of a rising proªt share. The trend in the ratio of household income to GDP is consistent with a shift to proªts: The share fell from 49 percent to 43 percent over the same decade.
It is possible to tell a plausible albeit untested story. The accelerated and sustained investment boom could be ªnanced without causing inºation, in part because the resultant increased claims on limited resources forced up prices relative to wages, at least in the sectors where prices were not governed by world prices and the exchange rate. This redistribution was not neutralized by "real wage resistance" and consequent inºation because the rapidly rising productivity of the urban economy permitted sufªcient growth in living standards to accommodate the relative fall in the wage share (the recorded increase of real wages in "urban units" being 11 percent per annum over the period 1998-2007).
The supply of investment: Funds
The differences in the behavior of various ownership types can be explained in part by the inefªcient ªnancial system. This has been the subject of considerable research, which we draw on subsequently. Until recently, the formal ªnancial system has been monopolized by the state-owned and state-controlled banks. Under central planning they simply acted as a conduit between government and the SOEs and did not perform the normal functions of commercial banks. As economic reform proceeded and a private sector developed, they gave priority to the state-owned sector.
The private sector was forced to fund investment mainly from retained proªts or from informal resources, normally at high cost. The state sector, by contrast, received easy bank loans at low interest rates. Loans were frequently made and used injudiciously, and this gave rise to a burgeoning burden on NPLs. These in turn required the banks to engage in distress lending, which exacerbated the situation.
China can be said to have a "repressed" ªnancial system (Riedel, Jin, and Gao 2007) . This repression can be seen as a means of placing resources at the disposal of the state. Both the interest rates that depositors receive and borrowers pay are well below the market-clearing rate. This is shown in Figure 2 : Both real rates of interest are low in relation to the likely rate of rate of return on investment and even negative in the late 1980s and mid 1990s because of bursts of inºation unanticipated by the ratesetting authorities. The excess demand for funds gives rise to credit market rationing. It is the state sector that beneªts from the rationing process. The domestic shareissuing companies (known as legal entities) are largely state controlled-with the central or local government being the dominant shareholder-and occupy an intermediate position. This is one way in which the domestic private sector continues to be the victim of policy discrimination.
Riedel, Jin, and Gao (2007) take the view that China's ªnancial system is one of the weakest links in the economy and that it will hamper future investment and economic growth. In that case, it must be asked why the inadequacies of the ªnancial system have not held the economy back in recent years, and how they have permitted such remarkably high rates of investment and growth. After all, China's formal ªnancial system is still dominated by the state-owned banks, lending primarily to the state sector: Even in 2004 the "big four" accounted for 62 percent of outstanding bank loans and had an NPL rate of 16 percent (Allen, Qian, and Qian 2008) . The two stock exchanges, established in 1990, played a limited and inefªcient funding role, being held back by speculation and insider trading. Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) argued that, in the face of formal credit rationing, the private non-listed sector relied heavily on informal ªnancial sources: retained proªts, informal intermediaries, and trade credits. The authors' explanation for the puzzle of the high investment rate that has been achieved is that the formal and informal sectors together have done enough not to constrain investment more seriously. Table 3 shows the sources of enterprise investment ªnancing of the different ownership types over the period for which data are available. We see the importance of retained earnings and informal funds ("self-raised funds and others" in the table) for all types of ownership. This is especially true of individually owned enterprises, which relied on such funding for over 95 percent of investment. Even SOEs-not being required to pay dividends to government-raised at least 60 percent in this way. Bank loans ("domestic loans") and capital transfers from government ("state budget") constituted 29 percent of SOE funding in 1994-96, rising to 36 percent in 2000-03. In the former period, SOEs received 63 percent of all bank loans and 42 percent in the latter period. By contrast, the corresponding shares of individually owned enterprises were 2 percent and 5 percent respectively. The corporate sector (approximated by "other types of enterprises"), which is mostly government-controlled, was on a par with SOEs by the early 2000s (receiving 25 percent of its funding from banks and 47 percent of bank lending).
We should guard against exaggerating the uniqueness of Chinese enterprises, in particular private enterprises, in their heavy reliance on their own savings. For instance, Mayer (1988) found that in the United Kingdom in the period 1970-85 proªt retentions accounted for 70 percent of corporate investment. Nor is it the case that a more competitive ªnancial system necessarily involves fewer ªnancial constraints on investment. For instance, conducting generalized method of moments (GMM) analysis on a panel of European countries over the period 1978-89, Bond et al. (2003) found that it was only in the UK, with the most competitive ªnancial sector, that cash ºow and proªt terms were statistically and quantitatively signiªcant in explaining corporate investment. Their tests rejected the interpretation that this was due to expectations formation, and they concluded that ªnancial constraints were relatively severe in the more market-oriented ªnancial system. Results such as these might be explained in terms of risk aversion by borrowers and lesser information on borrowers in more competitive ªnancial markets. 
Source: Authors' own calculation based on NBS Statistical Yearbook (various issues).

Note: Figures for each period are the mean values of the annual proportions; "other types of enterprises" refers to types of ownership other than state-owned, collectively owned, and individual economic units, namely, it includes joint ownership, shareholding, foreignfunded, and Hong Kong-, Macao-, and Taiwan-funded economic units.
Haggard and Huang (2008) examined the policy of the Chinese government toward the private sector. They distinguished between government-controlled corporate ªrms and genuinely private domestic ªrms. They argued that the latter sector was still relatively small and subject to many controls and permissions, for instance with regard to the provision of ªnance and the requirement of ofªcial approval of investment projects above a certain size. Government had allowed the private sector to develop-based on its efªciency-but had not actively supported it.
This account is consistent with evidence on the changing shares of ªxed asset investment ( Figure 3 ). The ownership structure of investment altered dramatically after Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour in 1992. In the next 14 years, the share of SOEs fell from two-thirds to one-third. However, this was largely due to the expansion of investment by shareholding companies ("other" ownerships), which were mostly companies previously classiªed as SOEs with ownership and control still dominated by the state. We see that the contribution of individually owned enterprises was no higher toward the end than it had been toward the start of the reform period.
In explaining these results, Haggard and Huang (2008) argued that, although the state-owned banks became more proªt-oriented over the decade, private investment was constrained because licensing policies tended to conªne private ªrms to 102 Asian Economic Papers Why Does China Invest So Much?
Figure 3. Total investment in ªxed assets by ownership
Source: NBS Statistical Yearbook (various issues).
low-proªt activities. These policies were interpreted in terms of a concern to maintain power and control by the Communist Party (CPC). For instance, foreign ªrms, because they did not pose such a political threat, received more favorable treatment than did domestic private ªrms: Their share of ªxed asset investment rose from the low ªgure of 6 percent in 1993 to 9 percent in 2003 (Haggard and Huang 2008) .
A rather different picture of the private sector is painted by Guariglia, Liu, and Song (2009) . They used a large panel of Chinese ªrms (all SOEs and all large non-state ªrms) over the years 2000-07 to investigate the determinants of the growth rates of ªrms, as measured by their growth in assets. Whereas SOEs averaged proportionate asset growth of 1.1 percent per annum over this period (limited by the demand for rather than the supply of funds) the ªgure for private ªrms was as high as 8.5 percent per annum. The authors deªned domestic private ªrms to include the corporate sector as well as individual owners. However, the main result of their analysis was found to apply also to the private individual sector on its own.
The main result concerns the coefªcient on the variable cash ºow as a proportion of assets. It is small and not signiªcant in the case of SOEs but positive, signiªcant, and close to unity in the case of private ªrms. The authors' interpretation is that private ªrms, being deprived of bank loans, are ªnancially constrained, whereas SOEs, receiving abundant bank loans, are not. This interpretation is supported by evidence that, among listed ªrms since 1990, the negative effect of leverage on investment is weaker, the higher the share of state ownership is in the ªrm (Firth, Lin, and Wong 2008) . The standard criticism of such an interpretation is that cash ºow might represent prospective investment opportunities rather than available funds (Hubbard 1998 ). Guariglia, Liu, and Song (2009) try to guard against this possibility by using lagged values as instruments. It is notable that the cash ºow (deªned as income plus depreciation) of private ªrms averaged almost 100 percent of their increase in assets (both being expressed as a proportion of assets). The implication is that the high proªtability and cash ºow of private ªrms in the early 2000s made possible their high asset accumulation, notwithstanding the distortions in the credit market. Dougherty and Herd (2005) also provide a more optimistic account of private sector development than do Haggard and Huang (2008) . They estimated (instrumented) value-added production functions to calculate total factor productivity (TFP) by ownership type for the period 1998-2003 using a large, industrial, ªrm-level sample. The standardized productivity of domestic private ªrms was found to be at least 90 percent higher than that of ªrms more than half-owned by the state. 3 Whereas 28 percent of their sample of ªrms was privately controlled in 1998, this ªgure had risen to 52 percent in 2003. The authors concluded that it was the superior efªciency of the private sector that had enabled it to expand rapidly over that period (Dougherty and Herd 2005) .
The study by Cull and Xu (2005) of the reinvestment rates of private ªrms, referred to earlier, also contained variables representing the availability of funds for investment. Their questionnaire indicated whether the ªrm had received a bank loan in the previous three years (28 percent had), and the collateral required as a proportion of loan received (averaging 25 percent). The greater the collateral required for a loan, the greater the reinvestment rate, suggesting that ªrms that are more risky have to be more reliant on internal funds. Having had access to a bank loan actually raises, rather than lowers, the reinvestment rate, other things being equal. This result is consistent with it being the most proªtable private ªrms with the largest investment opportunities that receive bank loans. Indeed, an equation predicting access to a bank loan indicates that access depends on proxies to ªrm performance as well as proxies for the closeness of ties with government. This implies that the banking system in the early 2000s did, at least in part, apply normal commercial banking criteria in making loans, at least to private ªrms. Cull, Xu, and Zhou (2007) examined the role of trade credit in funding investment in China. Trade credit can be an important source of short-term funds because of the informational advantages that suppliers often have over ªnancial institutions. In China, trade credit might also be a means for private sector ªrms to invest if they are unable to borrow from banks. In an analysis of large industrial ªrms, Cull, Xu, and Zhou found that ªrms with better access to bank credit offered more trade credit. In the case of SOEs, proªtability reduced the supply of trade credit, reºecting the investment opportunities that would be forgone. Less proªtable SOEs received more bank loans, possibly reºecting ªnancial distress, and they had the surplus funds to extend trade credit, possibly to retain their customers and suppliers. In the ªnancially constrained private sector, by contrast, more proªtable ªrms supplied more trade credit, reºecting their greater ability to do so. Although the authors concluded that trade credit was a likely source of funding investment by ªnancially constrained private ªrms, its relatively small size meant that it could explain only a minor part of private sector investment.
Ferri and Liu (2010) use a panel data set of 280,000 large industrial ªrms to examine the rate of interest paid on loans by ªrms of different ownership types over the period 2001-05. Even standardizing for ªrm size and industrial sector, they ªnd that SOEs pay the lowest rate of interest-lower by more than two percentage points than the rate paid by private ªrms. Moreover, if it were required to pay the same rate of interest as the private sector, the SOE sector as a whole would make a loss. This counterfactual may be extreme because of the likely general equilibrium effects and because the standardized interest rates paid by foreign ªrms occupy an intermediate position, thus suggesting a role for unobserved inºuences. Nevertheless, ªnancial liberalization can be expected to reduce SOE investment. Indeed, its perceived effect on SOE proªtability and investment may be a serious obstacle to the adoption of ªnancial liberalization.
The efªciency of investment: Static
It is generally found in the literature linking ªnancial development and economic growth that indicators of ªnancial development foster economic growth (King and Levine 1993; Wurgler 2000; Levine 2005 ). Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005, 2008 ) see China's experience as providing a counter-example. Despite the fact that the conventional proxies for the development of ªnancial intermediation, such as the importance of banks and of formal lending, suggest that China's ªnancial system is weak and undeveloped, China has achieved rapid economic growth. The authors' explanation is that informal sources of ªnance have developed in response to a need, and that these alternative arrangements-including the use of retained proªts, own savings, and informal borrowing-have proved an adequate remedy.
Does the immature ªnancial system nevertheless impose costs on the economy, in the form of investment misallocation? Dollar and Wei (2007) examine this question, ªnd that there is indeed misallocation, and attempt to quantify its cost. Their research is based on a sample of over 12,000 ªrms in 120 cities for the years 2002-04. The authors distinguish eight categories of ownership: state ownership (100 percent, 50-99 percent, and 1-49 percent), foreign ownership (using the same three categories), collective ownership, and domestic private ownership. State ªrms are found to receive more investment funding from the banking system than private ªrms. Regression analysis shows the conditional value of the ratio of value-added to capital to be 50 percent higher for private ªrms than wholly state-owned ªrms. Examining the determinants of the rate of proªt on capital, the authors ªnd a similar pattern. The partly state-owned ªrms generally occupy an intermediate position. The inference is drawn that non-state ªrms are held back by ªnancial constraints. A similar analysis of the value-added/labor ratio also reports wholly state-owned ªrms to be different: They have the lowest returns not only to capital but also to labor. Dollar and Wei (2007) go on to conduct a heroic counterfactual simulation analysis in which the value-added/capital ratio in the state-owned sector is raised to that of the private sector, and ªnd that misallocation of resources is worth some 5 percent of GDP. Guariglia and Poncet (2008) also address the issue of investment misallocation. They pose the question: How do various indicators of ªnancial development affect the growth rates of the capital stock and of TFP growth? They use annual province data over the period [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] , and attempt to solve the obvious endogeneity issues by means of system GMM estimation and reverse causality tests. Three sorts of ªnanc-ial indicators are introduced: conventional proxies for ªnancial intermediary development, such as the extent of bank loans; China-speciªc indicators of state intervention, such as the importance of bank loans made by the four main state-owned banks; and indicators of "market-driven ªnancing," such as the share of investment ªnanced by self-raised funds.
In both the equation for capital accumulation and the equation for TFP growth, the conventional proxies for ªnancial development and the indicators of state intervention have negative coefªcients. Only in the case of self-raised funds is the coefªcient positive. When the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) in total investment is interacted with the ªnancial variables, it is found to ameliorate the negative coefªcients. The conclusions drawn by Guariglia and Poncet (2008) are that the formal banking sector constrained provincial growth over this 15-year period although inºows of FDI helped to ease the constraint, and that the availability of informal ªnancing (from retained proªts, own saving, or informal credit) promoted provincial growth.
Nevertheless, the high degree of self-ªnancing in the private sector is not without its problems. According to the agency theory, pressures from external investors and managerial ownership encourage managers to pursue value-maximizing investment policies (Jensen 1986 ). Without external monitoring and effective internal controls, corporate managers have incentives to expand too far and too fast by simply investing their internal funds in low-return projects and activities. Thus the weak governance arrangements that arise, at least in part, from the immaturity of China's ªnancial system may well have reduced the efªciency of investment.
The efªciency of investment: Dynamic
Ding and Knight (2008a) examined the impact of investment in ªxed assets on the growth of GDP per capita over the period 1980-2000, using system GMM estimation methods in an attempt to establish causal relationships. The effect of investment as a whole was positive and signiªcant: A one percentage point increase in the ratio of ªxed investment to GDP was associated with a 0.15 percentage point increase in the growth rate. They found a sharp contrast when investment was disaggregated by ownership status. Investment made by SOEs was wasteful: Increasing the share of SOEs in total ªxed investment by one percentage point was associated with a decrease in the growth rate of 0.08 percentage points. Variation in the share of investment by collective ªrms made no signiªcant difference. Investment by private ªrms (including the corporate sector) had a powerful effect: A one percentage point rise in the investment share of the private ªrms was associated with a growth rate higher by 0.13 percentage points. Thus, the decline in the state's share of enterprise investment (shown in Figure 3) helped to raise the growth rate. Although the foreignowned component of private investment was small, Ding and Knight (2008a) also found that a given amount of FDI had a bigger effect on growth than did an equal amount of domestic private investment.
Nevertheless, it is an important question: Will the high rate of investment in China carry the seeds of its own destruction? This could happen in various ways. First, the rapid accumulation of capital can lead to a fall in its marginal product. Within a competitive framework, this should reduce the rate of proªt on capital and so deter future investment. That is the mechanism suggested by Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006), who found that the proªt rate on capital had not fallen and remained high despite rapid capital accumulation. Moreover, Lu et al. (2008) found that the proªt rate in industrial ªrms had risen substantially over the previous decade. Both studies concluded that China's high investment rate did not pose a threat to the proªtability of future investment.
Nevertheless, less sanguine evidence is offered by Qin and Song (2009) , who attempted to measure the extent of over-investment in China using province data for the period 1989-2004. By estimating a production function they were able to predict the proªt-maximizing level of investment. Deªning over-investment as actual minus proªt-maximizing investment, they found that there was widespread overinvestment and that the coastal provinces, being more reformed and more prosperous, were technically more efªcient but allocatively less efªcient, that is, they tended to show a greater degree of over-investment. There is also direct evidence of underutilization of capital in certain industries, particularly heavy industries dominated by the state (European Union Chamber of Commerce 2009). For instance, the percentage rate of excess capacity was reported to be 34, 46, 73, 84, and 88 percent in the steel, aluminium, calcium carbide, ferroalloy, and container industries respectively. 4 Bearing in mind the shape of the short-run average cost curve, "full capacity" is difªcult to deªne. Nevertheless, this suggestive evidence might help to explain why a high proportion of SOEs continued to make losses despite the rising average rate of proªt.
There are several possible reasons why the rapid accumulation of capital did not involve a fall in the prospective rate of proªt so steep that further investment would have been deterred. One possibility is that at the start of economic reform the ratio of capital to other factors of production was far below its equilibrium level, namely, the marginal product of capital was remarkably high. In a neoclassical growth model, a higher saving and investment rate implies a higher capital/labor ratio, and a correspondingly lower marginal product of capital in the steady state: The economy has further to travel to its long-run equilibrium. The answer might thus be that the Chinese economy was initially in extreme disequilibrium.
Second, rapid capital accumulation could take place without a signiªcant rise in the capital/labor ratio occurring. It is true that between 1978 and 2005 the capital stock rose by 10.5 percent per annum and the labor force rose by only 2.4 percent per annum, the implication being that the capital/labor ratio increased more than sevenfold. 5 However, it is widely accepted that at the start of economic reform China had a labor surplus economy par excellence (for instance, Knight and Song 1999, 2005) . Unemployment took a disguised form, both in the cities and in the countryside. The government preferred urban people to be underemployed in the factories rather than unemployed on the streets, but enterprise reform, starting in earnest in the late 1990s, together with urban economic growth, released underemployed labor mainly into more productive activities. The land reform of 1979-85 ensured that all rural households had their own leasehold land. Early estimates of surplus labor on the land (surveyed in Taylor 1988) suggested that 30 percent of peasants could be withdrawn from farming without loss of agricultural production. Thus, the reallocation of rural labor to activities in which its marginal product was higher (initially through rural industrialization and subsequently through rural-urban migration) helped to keep down the effective capital/labor ratio.
Third, starting from a situation of dire misallocation of resources, the reform process involved drastic structural changes-from agriculture to industry, from the state sector to the private sector, and from domestic to foreign markets. Each of these transfers offered proªtable opportunities and moved the economy toward its production frontier (Ding and Knight 2008b) . The rapid growth of the economy meant that relative resource reallocation could take place without serious excess capacity and resultant collapse in proªts occurring in the relatively declining sectors.
A fourth factor helping to maintain the rate of proªt on physical capital was the rapid growth of the complementary factor, human capital. The objective of compulsory basic education (six years of primary school and three years of middle school) was established in 1986, and had generally been met in the 1990s, at least in urban areas and the more prosperous rural areas. Higher education, although neglected until after the mid 1990s, was expanded remarkably thereafter. The proportions of adults with middle school, high school, and college education in the census year 1982, along with the ªgures from the national samples for 1995 and 2005, are shown in Table 4 . The proportion of adults with higher education rose from 1 to 7 percent between 1982 and 2005, and the proportion with more than primary education doubled, from 28 to 58 percent.
Both the stock of human capital (generating externalities) and its growth (increasing labor productivity) are found to be important contributors to China's rate of economic growth (Ding and Knight 2008a) . The availability of educated labor encourages and assists the absorption of new technology into the economy. Much ªxed investment of machinery and equipment embodies improved technology, some domestic and some imported from abroad. Thus, technological progress-increasing "efªciency units" of labor and thus decreasing the effective capital/labor ratio-has helped to keep up the proªtability of investment. However, there is no consensus on the rate of technological progress in China over the reform period. The various growth accounting exercises produce estimates ranging from 1.5 to 3.9 percent per annum (Borenzstein and Ostry 1996; Hu and Khan 1997; Woo 1998; Young 2003; Brandt, Hsieh, and Zhu 2008) , reºecting in part the different assumptions made. In any case, if investment raises efªciency both by embodying technological progress and also by improving resource allocation, TFP is a positive function of investment and cannot be separated from it.
A fall in investment for any reason could in turn reduce aggregate demand in the economy, further depressing investment. The virtuous circle of "high conªdence, high investment, high growth, fulªlled expectations, high investment . . ." could in this way be transformed into a vicious circle of "low conªdence, low investment, low growth, fulªlled expectations, low investment. . . ." Gong and Lin (2008) had this mechanism partly in mind in explaining the business cycle in China. They viewed the normally high investment rate as the product of a low real interest rate and the availability of an unlimited supply of unskilled labor. However, they noted that capacity utilization had declined in certain years, and that this had deterred investment, thus generating economic recession, namely, belowtrend growth. Their explanation ran as follows. A positive supply shock (the result of the relaxing of policy constraints) causes high investment. This generates inºa-tion. The resulting anti-inºation policies create over-capacity in the capital stock, thus reducing investment and slowing economic growth.
Although the account of Gong and Lin (2008) ªts some of the facts well, it leaves one question unanswered. The investment function in their model depends on expected capacity utilization. This would be inconsistent with the assumption of rational expectations and would require some other assumption, such as that of bureaucratic incentives, "irrational exuberance" or "animal spirits," to explain the periodic over-investment.
One possible explanation for the early reform period is provided by Kim (1994) . Given the powerful incentives of SOE managers to increase investment, informational weakness enabled them deliberately to understate their investment costs and capital capacities to the planners. Thus, the discrepancy between micro incentives and macro objectives could at times generate "investment overshooting." Soft budgets and low interest rates on loans allayed any concerns of investors about future macroeconomic corrections.
Drawing on Keynes's emphasis on animal spirits and the associated herd behavior, some modern macroeconomic models incorporate imperfect information and the simple decision rules to which this can lead. It is possible for such rules to produce biased correlations of beliefs and so generate waves of optimism and pessimism among investors (De Grauwe 2008) . Applying these ideas to China, there are reasons to expect irrational exuberance at a time of new and rapidly changing circumstances. According to Naughton (2007, p. 102 ), Deng's famous Southern Tour in 1992 opened the way for entrepreneurship, and set off "a gold rush mentality and ªnanc-ial excess." Much of that investment boom was due to local governments, which were responding to an exogenous shock, namely, the relaxation of constraints. The strength of their response can be explained by an incentive structure that rewarded local growth (in particular short-term growth), a lack of concern about risk on account of soft budgets, and an inability to anticipate and to see the new and emerging bigger picture.
Another explanation for China's cycles is provided by Brandt and Zhu (2000) . Arguing with reference to the period prior to the drastic reform of the SOEs, the authors attributed ºuctuations in investment and output to the declining proªtability of SOEs combined with continued state support for them Their growing losses required an increased transfer of both subsidies and credit. Credit allocation had been decentralized from government to the state banks early in the reform process. Despite indicative quotas, the local branches of state banks tended to collude with local governments in the pursuit of local economic development, so favoring the more proªtable non-state sector beyond quota. The continued state support for SOEs resulted in rapid growth of the money supply and accelerating inºation. This forced the central government to react by recentralizing and imposing strict controls on credit, both overall and to the non-state sector, which induced periodic recessions in investment and output. An implication of the interpretation provided by Brandt and Zhu is that the subsequent reform of the SOE sector provides some protection against the virtuous circle of high investment and growth being brought to an end by this source of shocks.
Conclusion
In economic research there is often a trade-off to be made between asking speciªc questions that can be tested rigorously and asking broad questions that do not lend themselves to formal tests. Despite the evidence and argument that we have mustered from the considerable literature on investment in China, we do not have a precise answer to the basic question: Why is investment so high in China? However, we can tell a plausible story.
Approaching the question ªrst from the demand side, we adduced evidence that the overall rate of return on capital was initially high and remained reasonably high. Moreover, the return on capital in industry rose substantially after 1998 in both the state and non-state sectors. Although there is a potentially important difference between the observed return on capital and the perceived future return on investment, this might well be the underlying reason why investment remained so high.
Why did proªtability remain promising enough to induce so much investment despite the remarkable rate of capital accumulation? It was probably maintained by rapid TFP growth and the ready supply of surplus labor that could be combined with the increase in the capital stock. Both would have helped to keep up the marginal product of capital. The rapid pace of spatial reallocation and urbanization, associated with structural change, increased the demand for both public and private investment in infrastructure. Starting from a situation of dire resource misallocation, economic reform and marketization achieved efªciency gains through the reallocation of resources toward more productive uses-from the state sector to the private sector, from agriculture to industry, and from domestic to foreign markets.
Entrepreneurial expectations of rapid economic growth were crucial for high investment. At the level of political economy: When the new leadership took power after the death of Mao Tse Tung it decided that economic development would have to be the policy priority if Communist Party rule was to survive. China became a "development state." Incentives were provided at all levels of governance to generate economic growth-in the country, in the province, in the city, and in the county. Bureaucrats were rewarded for promoting investment, and businessmen could make investment decisions with conªdence that policies for rapid growth would be pursued. The "coordination problem" (that each investment is unproªtable if made on its own but all can be proªtable if made together), which besets enterprise in many poor countries, could be solved in this way.
It is arguable that the Chinese economy has been in a virtuous circle with sustaining feedback effects. High investment produced rapid economic growth and rapid growth in turn produced buoyant expectations that then elicited high investment. The fact that the economy was growing rapidly meant that this relative resource reallocation could occur without the growth of huge surplus capacity and the collapse in proªtability of much of the relatively declining sectors. The fact that investment, much of it embodying improved technology, was so high it in turn raised the rate of technological progress. This helped to keep up the marginal product of capital and thus, once the economy was marketized, the rate of proªt on investment. The positive interaction between investment and efªciency gain from both technological progress and resource reallocation suggests that the endogenous growth theory offers a better theoretical framework for analyzing investment in China than does the neoclassical growth theory.
We have produced plausible accounts of the remarkably high saving rate in each of the three sectors: enterprises, households, and government. The inefªcient and repressed ªnancial system may well have played a part: Financially constrained private ªrms and households that saw proªtable opportunities may have increased their saving to make their investments. Without a national saving rate that matched the investment rate, the investment boom could have collapsed in the face of the ensuing macroeconomic imbalances.
The supply of funds does not ªt neatly into the explanation for high investment in China. Whereas a ready supply of bank loans at low interest rates has generally been available to the SOEs, non-state enterprises have had to rely on own savings or informal loans at high interest rates. Thus, investment has been biased toward the less proªtable ownership sector.
Despite the lower proªtability of this sector, SOE managers were keen to invest, partly because their objectives were more growth-oriented than proªt-orientated and partly because, until the late 1990s, they faced soft budgets and therefore had no need to be risk-averse. The high investment of the private sector occurred despite the discriminatory policies that they faced: the capital market imperfections, the controls on their investment (e.g., licensing requirements), and the legal weakness of contractual and property rights. This success was partly because the corporatized former SOEs were generally sufªciently state-owned to be state-controlled. It was also partly due to the greater efªciency of private ªrms, which enabled them to achieve higher proªt rates than the state-owned or state-controlled sectors.
There are several necessary conditions for China's high rate of investment, although none is likely to be sufªcient on its own. Our story would have been incomplete without examination of the reasons not only why the demand for investment was initially high and remained high but also why resources were available and funds could be secured for investment.
Our analysis provides insight into the question: Will investment remain high in China? On the demand side, a combination of technological progress, efªciency gain, abundant unskilled labor, and self-sustaining investor conªdence has maintained the prospective rate of return on investment despite the rising capital/labor ratio. There is no compelling reason why this should not continue for some years. However, potential threats include the brake that might be imposed by the failure to reform the markets for factors and resources, as argued by Huang and Tao (2010) ; the rapid emergence of labor scarcity to which the economy cannot adapt fast enough; and a negative shock that breaks the virtuous circle sustaining investor conªdence. A negative shock could arise from the speculative bursting of a ªnancial bubble (such as might occur as a result of the 2008-10 monetary expansion that was intended to counter economic recession), or through the growth of excess capacity (perhaps exacerbated by the current monetary expansion), which might increase NPLs and deter future investment, or through the eventually inevitable but unpredictable unwinding of China's present extreme external imbalance.
On the supply side, the literature implies that saving will be heavily dependent on government policy. The household saving rate might fall if the family planning policy is relaxed, if public provision of pensions, health care, and social security is improved, or if, as can be predicted, the dependency rate rises over the next decade as the labor force begins to fall and the number of pensioners rises. Further ªnancial liberalization and the ending of "ªnancial repression" are likely to equalize the cost of capital, raising it for state-owned and state-dominated forms and lowering it for private ªrms. The effect on saving is ambiguous-reducing the need for ªnancially constrained enterprises to save but raising the interest paid to savers, and the effect on investment is likely to be to raise its efªciency and thus its rate of return.
